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Abstract: The learning group in Regional Economics works in a similar way as the Balint 
medical group. During a session, a “problem” is presented by a group member, in the context 
of a rotation or “turn taking”. The other members do not try to ”solve the problem” by adding 
technical information or giving “advice” to the presenter. Instead, they explore its meaning by 
treating the issue as if it were their own problem, revealing in loud voice their free 
associations with the topic initially presented.  This kind of reflection helps the presenter 
because it forces her to “think further” about the issue, overriding the trend to solve the 
problem in an automatic, pseudo-intuitive way. 
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1. Introduction: previous experiences of group learning in 
Economics at a Lisbon University 
 
Standard learning methods in the university are quite simple as they imply a “receptive” stance 
by the students who are supposed to attend lectures given by professors and then revise the 
taught matter by reading textbooks after the classes. This “passive” posture is also an 
“individual” one, since students do not cooperate much among themselves while learning.  
Under this framework, learning is the simple memorization of the theory transmitted during 
lectures, while it should be rather regarded as the outcome of a personal reinterpretation of 
the programmed knowledge by the student. (THORNTON, 2010). 
Furthermore, this procedure excludes from learning an important segment of the school, 
namely more senior professors and researchers, who need a continuous updating of their 
knowledge basis and a collective backup of their individual research processes. Hence, at the 
Economics and Management Institute (ISEG) of the Technical University of Lisbon there is an 
attempt to form learning groups, that meet periodically with the purpose of supporting and 
advancing the personal research of each member. This attempt took two successive forms: the 
MicroUECE learning group; and the group-analytic coaching of the Economics Department 
Seminar at ISEG. 
1.1 The MicroUECE  group. 
 
During the academic year 2009-2010, a learning group, labeled as MicroUECE, was launched 
including researchers from a project inside UECE, the research center that contains most 
economics researchers within ISEG. This was indeed a “learning group” rather than a “team”, 
in the sense of THORNTON (2010), because it aimed to stimulate the private research goals of 
each of its members, rather than pursuing a common goal (a “research project” or a “joint 
paper”).  
A good description of workings of MicroUECE can be found in PONTES (2011). The members of 
this group had different specializations, although they could be subsumed under the common 
trait of Microeconomics, i.e. the field of Economics that deals with the decentralized behavior 
of individual economic agents (firms and households).
2
 The group had six members, including 
myself who acted as coach, given my previous experience in psychodynamics. Three group 
members were professors of the Economics Department of ISEG and the remaining members 
belonged to other Lisbon based institutions. 
The group MicroUECE had a monthly meeting. In each session, the coach assigned the “turn to 
speak” to each member, reserving for himself the last turn. 
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 Microeconomics  differs from  Macroeconomics, which is concerned with the behavior of aggregate 
variables, as the GDP, unemployment rate and so on. 
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The interventions by the members varied a lot in length of time: from a 5 minutes statement 
about the research work done since the last group meeting to a full presentation of a paper 
during about 30 minutes. Sometimes, the “turn taking” was upset by a dialog between the 
members who commented each other’s activities. This dialog always took place after all 
members had taken their “turn to speak”. 
Looking retrospectively, and referring to THORNTON’s (2010), learning in this group was the 
result of a tension between “holding” (the safety/stability feeling provided by the group 
working rules, which are enforced by the coach) and “exchange” (the contact with 
new/different knowledge, that works as a “challenge” for the subject of learning). Clearly, 
although very informal, MicroUECE ensured both of them.  On the one hand, “turn giving” 
gave “holding” to each participant, since it ensured that he was listened in silence by the other 
members, thus avoiding an excessively fierce competition for speaking time and tough 
criticisms among group members. On the other hand, the ensuing discussion created an 
opportunity for members to “exchange” ideas, thus making possible for each participant to 
benefit from new and challenging information. 
 
1.2 The group-analytic coaching of the regular seminar of the 
Economics Department of ISEG. 
 
The Economics Department of ISEG and UECE had for a long time a regular research seminar, 
with a weekly or fortnightly frequency. In each seminar session, a speaker (either from ISEG or 
from an outside institution) presents his research paper during about 45 minutes. Then, there 
is a period of questions and answers, where a member of the audience poses a question that is 
immediately answered by the presenter.  
The seminar had two related problems (see PONTES, 2011).  
• The first was an “empty room” problem. It often happened that very few people 
attended the seminar sessions (sometimes only the seminar organizers were present), 
which was particularly embarrassing when the presenter came from an outside far 
away institution and was faced with an apparent lack of interest of the home 
institution in his work. This problem was “hidden” in a certain way through the 
selection of a small room for the seminar to take place. 
• The second followed from the first one. The fact that very few people attended the 
seminar sessions created in the institutions such as FCT that evaluated UECE an 
impression that the research center lacked cohesion and that the research interests of 
its members had almost nothing to do with each other. 
The reform of the seminar protocol was threefold: 
1. The seminar room was moved to a larger room, in order to reveal fully the core issue, 
i.e. the “empty room” problem. 
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2. The scarcity of the audience was accounted for by a lack of “holding” by the seminar 
attenders. Nowadays, most research in Economics is very “technical” and specialized, 
making it difficult for listeners to understand and adhere to its premises. In order to 
overcome this problem, a coach was introduced, with the specific mission of 
“explaining” the paper, using a simple, non-technical language. The coach varied from 
session to session, but he was always a member of ISEG, often endowed with authority 
(a Full Professor, Chairman of ISEG, Chairman  of UECE, Head of the Economics 
Department) in order to maximize the “safety” feeling among the attenders. 
3. During the discussion stage, the presenter was kept “outside the session” (in silence) 
in order to stimulate the attenders to speak and give a personal reinterpretation of the 
paper to the speaker, who therefore received “exchange” for its presentation. The 
presenter only spoke in the end of the session, drawing the main conclusions. 
This reform faced a lot of resistance, so that it worked fully only during 2010-2011 when the 
author of these lines took it in charge personally. In the following year, 2011-2012, the room 
and the coach where kept, but the practice of keeping the speaker “outside the discussion 
period” was discarded. Finally, in 2012-2013 (the current academic year), even the coach was 
removed, with the consequence that the “empty room problem” emerged again. 
In academic year 2011-2012, we launched a new learning group where the scope was defined 
as “Regional, Urban and Transport Economics”, with the acronym UrbanEcon. However, this 
time we wanted the group to work according to a more precise protocol. Following 
THORNTON’s (2010) suggestion, the so-called Balint group appeared as the most efficient and 
time-saving model
3
. Saving time matters because usually professors have their time consumed 
by heavy teaching loads and administrative work, so that their availability to meet is rather 
limited. 
Consequently, in order to understand the workings of UrbanEcon, we need to have an insight 
of the Balint group. 
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2. The Balint group 
 
2.1 What is a Balint group? 
 
Balint groups are made by doctors (general practitioners or GPs) and they stem from the work 
of psychoanalysts Michael and Enid Balint in the UK in the beginning of the fifties of last 
century.  This kind of groups have developed and evolved much since then. The main goals of 
Balints’ work were, according to LICHTENSTEIN and LUSTIG, 2006: 
1. To encourage doctors to value their own interpersonal skills and become aware of 
their own limitations in this field. 
2. To increase the perception and understanding by the doctors of the patients’ 
communications. 
3. To enable doctors to become conscious of the blind spots (aspects that they neither 
want nor are able to understand) during their interactions with the patients.  
A Balint group is made up of a certain number of GPs, between 6 and 12,
4
 and a group leader 
endowed with psychoanalytical (or group-analytical) training. Sessions have a weekly or 
fortnightly frequency and may last for several years.  
Michael Balint mentioned that “a personality change” through this technique takes about 2  
years to be completed, so that a group should last, at least, for this time lapse. KJELDMAN et 
al. (2004) consider that some effect is felt after 1 year of regular sessions, so that they classify 
the doctors in the following classes: 
1. GPs that never participated in a Balint group. 
2. “Young” Balint GPS, who have attended the group during 1 or 1.5 years. 
3. “Experimented” Balint GPs, with 2 or more years in the Balint group. 
In each session, according to a rotation, a GP presents a clinical case involving one patient. 
Then, the group discusses the case, exploring it from the perspective of both the doctor and 
the patient. 
2.2. “Patient-centered” instead of  “disease-centered” medicine 
 
The main contribution of the Balints’ work consists in that it does not attempt to isolate a 
specific “disease” (either psychological or organic) in the patient whose case is discussed in the 
group using “technical” or “medical” knowledge. Instead the group treats the patient as whole, 
a “human being”, integrated in her social environment, rather than a mere set of symptoms 
(BALINT, 1969). 
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 Some authors mention a range between 6 and 10. Others say that the group should be comprised by 
between 8 and 12 members. 
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In the traditional medical relationship, the doctor had an active role as some kind of “detective 
of diseases” in the patient.  By contrast, Balint groups assume that the patient has an active 
role by choosing a specific way of “using” the doctor, as if the doctor were some kind of 
“medicine”. Hence, the patient is not in a fixed position assigned by the doctor, but he is rather 
“loose”, in the sense that he can choose the kind of relationship that he desires to maintain 
with the doctor. The relationship itself is in the center of the discussion by the Balint group 
(KJELDMAN et al, 2004).. 
This shift of perspective can take place in any kind of learning group as the UrbanEcon group in 
Economics School. Suppose that a group member presents a research problem. Then, rather 
than attempting to solve the problem exactly through the use of a technical knowledge, the 
group can try to “reframe” the problem through exploring its meaning. According to this line of 
behavior, each group member deals with his free associations with the problem presented and 
he treats the problem as if it were his own problem.  
 
2.3. Benefits of the Balint process 
 
The working of a Balint group for several years improves the quality of the doctor-patient 
relationship, thus benefiting both.  TURNER and MALM (2004) report that “resident” GPs who 
had participated in training available through the Balint group had higher grades than those 
GPs without Balint training in fields such as: 
• Knowledge of the reactions by the patient to his doctor. 
• Self-understanding by the doctor. 
The improvements concerning the patient were unsurprising: 
1. Doctors feel more able to treat patients with psychosomatic diseases. 
2. They feel also more skilled to handle patients with “vaguely defined” or “intractable” 
health conditions. 
3. They tend neither to refer this kind of patients to other doctors, nor to prescribe 
unnecessary exams, in order to “get themselves rid” of the patient. 
However, the gains for the doctors themselves were rather unexpected (KJELDMAN et al., 
2004): 
1. They seem to have developed a higher ability to control their working hours, both in 
terms of content and time spending. 
2. They appear to be more satisfied with their work situations. 








2.4 “Holding”: the safe environment and stable rules. 
 
A key factor of learning in a Balint group, as in any small group, is the creation and of an 
atmosphere of “safety” and “trust”, similar to what is given by the mother to her child when 
she “holds” the baby in her arms (THORNTON, 2010). 
In the particular case of the Balint group, “safety” follows from a stable set of rules 
implemented by the leader.  These rules prevent the members from competing too fiercely for 
speaking time and allow them to express divergent points of view without being subjected to 
harsh criticism or cross examinations. 
The rules may take this form: 
1. A GP presents a clinical case in 10 minutes. The other members keep silent. 
2. The group discusses this case, as if it were their own, during 20-25 minutes. During this 
stage, the presenter “stays out” of the group, keeping silent. 
3. The presenter ”comes back” and outlines the topics of the discussion that were more 
helpful from his viewpoint in 5-10 minutes. 
4. All the group members talk freely. Each participant tries to express the “repressed 
feelings” experimented during the former stages, during 15 minutes. 
This protocol allows each member to feel “safe” when he is speaking, because it ensures that 
the others “listen” to what he is saying.  As KJELDMAN et al. (2004), p. 235, say: 
The stable frames and safe milieu in the Balint group, maintained by the 
leader, can probably act as a greenhouse, facilitating the physician’s 
growth. 
2.5 “Exchange”: mobilizing the group to its task 
 
The concept of “exchange” is related with the emergence in a group of “new” or “different” 
knowledge which “challenges” the group members and leads to their growth. 
According to THORNTON (2010), in a Balint group there is no common learning goal, each 
participant having his own learning task. However, JOHNSON et al. (2004) say that the leader 







2.6 Why does the Balint group work? 
 
LICHTENSTEIN and LUSTIG (2006) give the following rationale for the efficiency of Balint groups 
in improving both the patient and the GP. They are inspired by the work of Economics Nobel 
laureates KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY on the intersection of economics and psychology. 
When a GP faces a new patient, he feels uncertain about diagnosis. Moreover, he has to take a 
fast decision because either the case is urgent, or he has many patients to handle during a 
short time lapse. Then, the doctor is tempted to rely automatically on his “intuition”. The 
diagnosis thus produced may reveal itself as false, being the outcome of a premature closure 
of the diagnosis process. 
In this situation, the doctor needs to stop and monitor her automatic intuition. Probably, it is 
advisable to consult the medical literature, or a colleague or to prescribe more exams, in order 
to superimpose automatic intuition with deliberate reflexive thought. 
The Balint group is very efficient in performing this process of “supervising carefully” the 
intuition of each of its members. The group’s role is not to give “technical advice” to the 
involved GP, since this advice could also be distorted.  Instead, each group member should say 
in loud voice “…if I had this case, how would I behave”. 
 
3 The learning group in “Regional, Urban and Transport 
Economics” (acronym UrbanEcon)  
 
In ISEG, a learning group in the field of “Regional, Urban and Transport Economics” was 
launched, starting in 23
rd
 May 2012, thus completing now about 8 months. It borrows the 
Balint protocol described above in subsection 2.4, so that its members are now “young 
Balints”. It is planned that it should last for two years, the standard lapse of time for this kind 
of group. 
“Regional and Urban Economics” deals with the location choice by households and firms at 
both a macro-scale (the “region”) and a micro-scale (the “city”). The analysis is focused not 
only in static terms, concerning the formation of economic landscapes, but also according to a 
dynamic perspective, concerning regional growth. 
“Transport Economics” is a different field, since it is related with the sectorial organization of 
the flow of cars/buses, trains and airplanes. Nevertheless, it is related to the former topic, 
since there is a two-way causal link between the adoption of modern transport technologies 
and the locational pattern. 
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“Regional, Urban and Transport Economics” perform an analysis mostly at the disaggregated 
agent (household, firm, transporting agent), so that it exhibits a distinctly “microeconomic” 
flavor. Most research in this field is empirical, although a minority of researchers attempt to 
apply microeconomic theory (including game theory) to location choices and regional growth. 
The UrbanEcon group was initially composed by seven members (including myself as a group 
leader), who are mostly college professors, although there is also a non-teaching researcher, 
belonging to a state lab.  While most members engage in applied economics, two of them have 
interests in microeconomic theory, particularly in game theory. 
An eight member, from the Mathematics Department of ISEG, joined the group in 2/10/2013. 
The group has a one hour meeting each fortnight. The meeting takes place regularly at the 
same day, at the same time, in the same room (or in neighboring rooms). The room is 
equipped with a large, white board and the members sit around a table. Each group session is 
announced two weeks before and a reminder is sent two days before the meeting. 
Announcements and reminders are mad by Email. 
The topics of the group sessions that took place already and the presenters are the following: 
1. Pedagogical problems raised by the discipline Urban Economics (undergraduate 
students). Presenter José P.  Date: 23/05/2012. 
2. Characteristics and regional distribution of older workers in Portugal. Presenter: João  
L. Date: 06/06/2012. 
3. Challenges posed by the reform of urban taxation. Presenter: Vítor E. Date: 
20/06/2012. 
4. Potential of development of a mega-cluster around the ocean in Portugal. Presenter: 
Regina S. Date: 3/07/2012. 
5. Coordination games in regional economics. Presenter: Joana P. Date: 18/07/2012. 
6. Coordination games in regional economics. Presenter: José P.  Date: 19/09/2012. 
7. Non monocentric cities – their importance in the Portuguese economy. Presenter: 
Manuel C. Date: 3/10/2012. 
8. Finding “missing” data during the estimation of environmental externalities in 
transportation. Presenter: Elisabete A. 
9. Agglomeration economies – the case of cork industry in Feira. Presenter: João L. Date: 
31/10/2012. 
10. Evidence of corporate social responsibility. Presenter: Manuel C. Date: 21/11/2012.  
11. Appraisal of programs of cohesion policy in the long run for 15 Portuguese regions.  
Presenter: Regina S. Date: 4/12/2012. 
12. Coordination games in regional economics. Presenter: José P. Date: 9/01/2013. 
13. The role of institutions of Higher Education on regional development. Presenter: Vítor 
E. Date: 23/01/2013. 
14. Development of a research program in Transport Economics and Policies both at the 
national and European levels. Presenter: Elisabete A. Date: 6/02/2013. 
15. Social and Economic Networks. Presenter: Joana P. Date: 27/02/2013. 
16. Geographic capital: a challenging research frontier, Canadian and EU comparisons. 
Presenter: Regina S. Date: 13/03/2013. 
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17. Regional integration and business locations: a long run approach to the cork industry 
in the Iberian Peninsula. Presenter: João L. Date: 20/03/2013. 
18. Portuguese aquaculture: the emergence of an “Anti-Commons” tragedy? Presenter: 
Manuel C. Date: 10/04/2013. 
19. European transport policy. Presenter: Elisabete A. Date: 8/05/2013 
20. Territorial governance in Portugal. Presenter: Regina S. Date: 29/05/2013. 
21. Communication in coordination games and regional development. Presenter:  José P. 
Date: 19/06/2013. 
22. Balanced growth. Presenter: Joana P. Date: 18/09/2013. 
23. Fraction panel data with non-observed heterogeneity: an application to intra-trade 
indices. Presenter:  Isabel P.  Date:2/10/2013 
24. Contracting in the context of territorial multi-level administration. Presenter: Vítor E. 
Date: 16/10/2013. 
25. A network approach to regional economic growth. Presenter: João L. Date: 30/10/2013 
26. Coordination games and economic development. Presenter José P. Date: 13/11/2013. 
 
 
4 Adaptations made in UrbanEcon in relation to the medical 
group. 
 
We will now describe the main adaptations that UrbanEcon shows in relation to the medical 
Balint group at the different protocol stages. 
 
4.1 The presentation stage 
 
Our initial intention was that both “pedagogical” problems (arising with students) and 
“scientific” problems could be tackled during group sessions. The former problems seemed to 
me a more straightforward application of the Balint work.  Hence, in the first session, I myself 
presented a “problem” concerned with an apparent “teacher’s failure” in an “Urban 
Economics” discipline for undergraduate students.  
However, my colleagues did not find pedagogical problems to be interesting enough for being 
the subject of reflection in the group. Henceforth, all presenters but me proposed 
scientific/research problems for discussion. My interpretation is that “research” is nowadays a 
much more decisive factor of professor’s promotion than teaching. We can also interpret this 
attitude as a way of avoiding to deal with human relationship problems and concentrating 
instead  in “technical”, impersonal information. 
With the exception of Joana P. and myself, who are engaged in theoretical work (application of 
game theory to regional growth), each group member used each one of her presentations to 
discuss a different problem (a different project of a paper).  I told them that this was not 
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necessary, so that the same “problem” could be repeated in several sessions, may be with a 
slight shift of focus.  This repetition is standard in medical groups, where the same patient is 
repeatedly seen by the doctor for several months or years. 
How to explain this difference?  My opinion is that the group members find the group time too 
precious to be “wasted” with the discussion of a single paper more than once. Furthermore 
the repetition of the same “problem” across group meetings could make their inquiry too 
“deep” and “subjective”, so that it was avoided. 
In the medical group, the presenter is selected without preparation, in the beginning of the 
session. Furthermore, presentations are exclusively verbal, no written notes being allowed as 
basis for the presentation. By contrast, in UrbanEcon, the presenter is selected in advance (in 
each session, the presenter is chosen for the next session), he is supposed to write a note with 
topics, not longer than a A4 sheet of paper, one-sided, and send it in advance to other group 
members.  
Clearly, this adaptation decreases the “spontaneity” of the group meeting and increases the 
role of the “technical information” in the reflection in detriment of the free association of each 
member with the problem presented. But it is needed since the session is focused on a 
“scientific problem”, rather than on a human relationship problem. The written note also 
provided a record of the topics discussed during the session.  
Furthermore, the members showed a tendency to increase the size of the written note beyond 
the upper bound and it was necessary to stress that this bound should always be respected, 
for the sake of the verbal nature and spontaneity of this process.  Again, we can conclude that 
the members tried to increase the role of “technical” and “scientific” information in detriment  
of a more personal engagement in the process. 
Since some of the presentations were related to papers where the presenters had co-authors, 
these were also invited to join the group in the respective session. This also concerned foreign 
co-authors who happened to be in Lisbon at the time of the group session.  
 
4.2 Reflection by the group 
 
On some occasions, the leader of the group had to intervene in order to prevent a direct reply 
by the presenter to the member of the group that made a sharp comment. This happened 
more often in the first sessions. As practice accumulated, this kind of interventions by the 
group leader became unnecessary. 
In order to ensure a safe atmosphere, so that each member should have time to make a 
comment, a “turn-taking” structure was implemented in this stage. However, as Vítor E. 
noticed, this structure of the reflection stage is merely optional and can be broken in some 
circumstances (and indeed it was). In this case, the group leader had to ensure informally that 




4.3 Reaction to comments by the presenter 
 
The presenter in UrbanEcon tried to reply to all members of the group, instead of 
concentrating on those comments that contributed more to further his own research, as in the 
standard Balint group. This behavior aimed to preserve a “nice” and “good-mannered” 
atmosphere during the group session at the cost of making the learning process less efficient. 
 
4.4 Final revision by the group. 
 
This stage proved to be very important not only to allow the members to say “what had not 
been said before”, thus revealing repressed feelings, as in the standard Balint group, but also 
to introduce a discussion where the participants can compete more freely while speaking. 
Up to now, the structure “one talks, the other listens in silence” preserved “safety” among the 
group members, giving “holding” to the presenter in particular. Now the members are free to 
challenge each other with “different” knowledge, thus creating the opportunity of “exchange” 
to arise. 
This is the more therapeutic stage. During one of the last sessions, Regina S. said “this process 
enables us to learn and, moreover, it makes us feel good”. 
 
4.5. Is the analogy between the general practitioners’ (GP) group and 
the economics professors’ (EP) group sound? 
 
From what has been said above, it is clear that there are important differences between GP’s 
and EP’s groups.  Firstly, the GPs are by definition unspecialized physicians. By contrast, the 
EPs engage in research in a very narrowly defined and specialized way, although they are all 
committed with the spatial or geographic nature of economic phenomena. Secondly, GPs in a 
Balint group discuss a clinical case, so that a third person (a patient) is involved. By contrast, in 
the UrbanEcon group no third part is involved in the process. Instead, a “problem/question” 
that arises during research is brought to the group and discussed within it. 
These differences do not matter very much.  Even if the members of EPs group have 
differentiated skills, the “holding” provided by the group allows them to find a “common 
ground”, where they can communicate freely at an “empirical” level. This means that, when a 
presenter puts forward a “problem”, there will be one or two members that can give a 
“technical” contribution, while the others can “reframe” the problem, by associating it freely 




That most communication is “non-technical” explains the coexistence within the group 
UrbanEcon of members with very dissimilar background. For instance, a member belongs to a 
Geography Department, where very little mathematics is taught, and another one works in  a 
Mathematics Department. One should bear in mind that in this kind of group, learning goals 
are private to each group member. 
Secondly, the “problem/question” presented in the beginning of each UrbanEcon group is not 
completely subjective, as it is backed by a set of bibliographic references (i.e., journal articles, 
books) whose knowledge is shared by a community. This “outside community” is the analogue 
in the EPs group the “outside patient” in the GPs group. 
Consequently, we can say that the economics professors’ group works indeed like a Balint 
group. 
 
5. An example: what did I learn personally with UrbanEcon? 
 
Within UrbanEcon, besides coaching the group, I was also a presenter and a group member. 
For that purpose, I teamed up with Joana P., so that we coordinated our presentations in order 
to write a final joint paper. 
Our learning goal concerned the modeling of regional growth through non-cooperative game 
theory. Let us assume a static game with several (Nash) equilibrium points. The selection of a 
single equilibrium involves the specification of beliefs by each player concerning the other 
players. Different equilibrium points may involve very heterogeneous outcomes, namely 
stagnation versus growth.  As LUCE and RAIFFA say: 
For a given society, a set of moves and patterns of behavior gradually 
build up and then remain stationary for long periods of time; yet 
another society, with approximately similar initial conditions, will evolve 
to a quite distinct pattern of cultural norms. Loosely speaking, we may 
regard these as two possible equilibrium “solutions” to this game. (LUCE 





An example is given by the following profits matrix: 
 
Clothing Producer







The story behind the matrix is the following. Assume that there are two firms that operate in 
the same region. The regional economy is closed to trade, so that neither imports, nor export 
are allowed.  
Each firm has two available actions: either to invest in a new factory (action “I”), or refrain 
from investing in production (action “N”). If a firm does not invest, the consumers self-produce 
its good at home. We assume that each consumer spends exactly one half of his income in 
each good. 
The firms are complementary in the sense that they create demand to each other. If both firms 
invest, the additional output is sold to the workers in the other firm and makes a profit of8 . If 
a firm invests and the other one does not invest, the former does not make money, since it 
cannot sell the increased output to consumers. If a firm does not invest in a new factory, it 
buys bonds that ensure an income of 6. 
Clearly, in this game, there are two (Nash) equilibrium points: ( ) ( ),  and ,I I N N 5.  Indeed, if 
a firm invests (resp. not invests), the best reply of the other is also to invest (resp. not invest). 
These equilibria have very different meanings: 
• Equilibrium ( ),N N  is related with economic stagnation, due to a “poverty trap”. 
• Equilibrium ( ),I I   is related with regional growth following from productive 
investment. 
Since there are two equilibria, each player is uncertain concerning the choice made by the 
other firm. It is necessary to select a single equilibrium by specifying the expectations of each 
firm on the other firm’s behavior. Clearly, there are reasons to select either equilibrium point. 
A good treatment of this topic can be found in COOPER (1999). 
• Equilibrium ( ),I I is “dominant in profits”: no other outcome of the game gives each 
player a profit higher than this equilibrium point. 
• Equilibrium ( ),N N is “risk dominant”, i.e. it is based on the less risky N  strategy. In 
order to realize this, notice that strategy N  gives the certain profit 6, while strategy 
                                                          
5
 These are pure strategy equilibria. There is also a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium which we find 
unnecessary to mention. 
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I gives 8 as a best result, and 0 has a worst result. In the absence of sufficient 
information, the player assumes that the opponent assigns probability 1 2  to each 
one of her actions. Hence, the profit that is expected to result from I  strategy is
1 1
8 0 4 6
2 2
   
+ = <   
   
. 
Our problem was to determine under what conditions the two possible outcomes would arise. 
It was clear to us that this is related with the working of pre-play communication between the 
two firms. Were this communication bilateral and successful, then the firms would settle in the 
“profits dominant” equilibrium, they would both invest and there would be regional growth. 
Otherwise, neither firm would invest, the result being economic stagnation. 
Apart from Joana P. and I, the other group members are mainly interested in applied research. 
However, they have helped us in three different ways: 
1. They reassured us that this approach to regional growth was both sound and 
insightful. 
2. Being themselves applied researchers, they  listed several examples  that they freely 
associated with our theoretical model: 
• In International Economics (made by Armando P.), a firm that invests abroad 
seeks to bring with it its suppliers of parts. For instance, this has happened 
with Japanese automakers in the US. 
• In European Economics, negotiations around the European Budget can be 
modeled as a coordination game.  For instance, investments in High-speed rail 
lines in different countries are complementary on account of network 
externalities. 
• In Regional Economics, the rules for allocating Structural Funds (SFs) obey the 
condition of “collective efficiency” (see Quadro de Referência Estratégica 
Nacional –QREN). This means that the efficiency of an investment that gets 
finance from SFs is not calculated in isolation, but as a part of the efficiency of 
a set of activities that form with it a regional cluster. 
 
3. Not being very much acquainted with non-cooperative game theory, they suggested 
that a cooperative game approach would always lead to the outcome of investment 
and growth. Assume that the formerly independent firms are now part of a corporate 
group that chooses their actions in order to maximize the joint profit.  The payoff 
matrix of the group is now: 
 
8 8 16 0 6 6





+ = + =





It is clear that the group will set up two complementary factories, thus making a profit 
of 16. However, this solution will be unfeasible if the costs of negotiating a cooperative 
agreement between the two firms are prohibitive. Then, we have to resort to a non-
cooperative solution. The explicit modeling  of a pre-play  negotiating stage seems 
necessary. 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
The learning group in Regional Economics works in a similar way as the Balint group. During a 
session, a “problem” is presented by a group member, following a rotation or “turn taking” 
scheme. The other members do not attempt to solve the problem by adding technical 
information or through “advice” to the presenter. Instead, they explore its meaning dealing 
with the issue as if it were their own problem. Hence, they voice their (free) associations with 
the topic initially presented. 
This kind of reflection helps the presenter because it forces him to “think further” about the 
issue, thus monitoring and “overriding”, if needed, the tendency to solve the problem in an 
automatic, pseudo-intuitive way. 
Nevertheless, the UrbanEcon group bears some specific features if compared with a medical 
group. Now the process is centered on scientific research, rather than on human relationships, 
with the consequence that the group’s working is more formal. The “turn taking” scheme is 
planned in advance, rather than being spontaneous and made “on the spot”. Technical 
information plays a more prominent role in the UrbanEcon, leading to the fact that 
information in each session is backed by a “written note”, which however is kept very small by 
the group leader. 
The time lapse of this study is only 8 months. Typically Balint groups require at least two years 
if they are to change the professional behavior of members. We intend to update this paper 
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